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概要
　この論文は、東ティモールとカンボジアにおける平和構築活動の比較分析を主目的と
する。東ティモールの平和構築は、UNAMETから始まり、その後 Interfet（非国連ミッ
ション）、UNTAET、UNMISET、UNOTILそして現在の UNMITと続いている。当国
の平和構築は UNTAETそして UNMISET期における熱狂的な国際社会の支持にもかか
わらず、その後の 2006年に起きた政治危機、そして 2008年のクーデターの失敗を見る
ようにその評判は徐々に色褪せていったと言える。しかしこのパターンはまさに国連ミッ
ションにおいては東ティモールのそれの 8年前に設立されたカンボジアミッションの傾
向と一致している。両国における平和構築活動の民主化活動への失敗は、過去の国連平和
ミッションにおける教訓に対する対応の不適切さが指摘される。
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Abstract
　　This paper focuses on the entire peace-building process in Timor-Leste, by 
comparing with that in Cambodia. Peace-building in Timor-Leste started in UNAMET, 
following Interfet (non-UN mission), UNTAET, UNMISET, UNOTIL and UNMIT. 
Despite the seeming successful completion of UNTAET and UNMISET, continuing 
fragile stability, such as the crisis in 2006 and an unsuccessful coup in 2008, has 
convinced that peace-building in Timor-Leste has not been as successful as had been 
expected. It is to be noted that this pattern has much similarity to the case in Cambodia 
in the UNTAC and post-UNTAC periods. The failure in democratization in both states 
poses a serious question on the effectiveness of the so-called “lesson-learned” strategy 
in peace operations.
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1. Introduction
United Nations (UN) peace-building is a relatively new peace operation with multi-
functional sectors. The current post-Cold War period especially identiﬁes the increasing 
demand for post-conﬂict peace-building.
One can see several theories and arguments on the new advent of peace-building. 
For example, David Roberts argued that while some state-building efforts have not 
produced the anticipated results in terms of the rule of law and democracy, the solution 
is not to rethink the approach per se but to develop the existing model until it does 
succeed. He encourages internally legitimate plural-indigenous systems with long-term 
sustainability.1 Roland Paris argued that peace-building sees its significance in rapid 
democratization and marketization, and as a result immediate liberalization generated 
a number of destabilizing side-effects. He therefore suggested longer and more 
penetrative operations.2 Simon Chesterman’s argument is similar to Paris. He pointed 
out that UN transitional administrations are still immature enough to have several 
contradictions between ends and means, bringing about inconsistency, inadequacy, and 
irrelevancy in UN peace-building.3 Meanwhile, David Chandler stated using from the 
case of the Balkans, that state-building non-Western states without self-government 
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would result in the institutionalization of weak states which have little relationship with 
their societies and lack legitimate authority.4
Similarly, there is much “lesson-learnt” type of literature about UN peace-building. 
After writing such literature, however, few authors analyzed the next cases on UN 
operations to conﬁrm whether the lessons which they gave were in fact learnt or not. 
Unless such lessons are sent to the UN and put into the agenda when it sets up the next 
mission, the UN will have another “partially-successful” or “unsuccessful” operation or 
receive similar lessons to the previous ones again. In reality, this negative tendency has 
frequently happened in UN peacekeeping and peace-building.
In this context, this paper will deal with two states having experienced UN peace 
operations as post-conﬂict peace-building measures, Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Both 
states have commonalties in the background of UN-led peace-building: long-term 
foreign occupation and extremely brutal human rights violations equivalent to ethnic 
cleansing. The international community tried to democratize both states by conducting 
general elections or referenda, and then by initiating huge scale multi-functional UN 
peace operations.
In fact, the UN peace operations in Cambodia, the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was said to be a huge success when it completed its 
mandate and departed from Cambodia in September 1993. This reputation was mainly 
due to the successful conduct of UN-led democratic elections in May 1993. However, 
despite such enthusiasm for the successful election, the reputation of UNTAC has 
been gradually tarnished by the subsequent political and democratic stalemate in the 
state. In fact, according to one survey conducted in 2004, only 30% of the Cambodian 
people assessed UNTAC positively.5 This was also recognized by a number of academic 
literature critical of the comprehensive assessment of the peace-building process in 
Cambodia by the international community.
This paper will mainly focus on the utility of such lessons-learnt type of literature 
on the Cambodian peace-building process for Timor-Leste, which has a similar 
background to Cambodia and started about seven years after the Cambodian peace-
process. Therefore, it can be argued that the case of Timor-Leste is the best position to 
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learn from the lessons of Cambodia suggested by academics and practitioners.
The conclusion of this paper will give a negative view to adhering on the lesson-
learnt analysis and will encourage to broaden a wider view to adapt to post-conflict 
peace-building.
2. Legitimacy of Research: Commonalities in the Background of Peace-building between 
Cambodia and Timor-Leste
First of all, both Cambodia and Timor-Leste have long histories of foreign 
occupation. Cambodia became independent from France in 1953. During the Vietnam 
War in the 1960s, Cambodian territory was used by Vietnamese guerrillas to move 
supplies and establish bases to fight against the US and South Vietnamese troops. 
Consequently, Cambodia suffered many casualties due to the secret bombing from the 
US military. In 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia to overthrow the Maoist 
Khmer Rouge regime, with tens of thousands of Cambodian people ﬂeeing to Thailand 
as refugees. A new government was established in Cambodia by the Vietnamese. The 
Vietnamese-led Government ruled Cambodia until the early 1990s. Timor-Leste had 
been colonized by Portugal for about 400 years until 1974, when civil wars broke out 
among the factions which supported independence and integration with Indonesia. 
In December 1975, more than 1,000 Indonesian troops landed in the capital of Dili, 
and occupied the territory of Timor-Leste. Without any international recognition 
of Indonesia’s annexation of Timor-Leste, in May 1976 the Indonesian Parliament 
approved Timor-Leste as the 27th province of the state. Since then, a constant size of 
15,000-20,000 Indonesian troops had been deployed in Timor-Leste until 1999.
It should also be noted that both Cambodia and Timor-Leste experienced the history 
of genocide and resistance. As Ben Kiernan put in his book Genocide and Resistance 
in Southeast Asia, two cases of genocide and extermination in Cambodia and East 
Timor began in the same year, 1975. The Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot ruled 
Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, and Indonesia’s Suharto regime ruled East Timor (Timor-
Leste) from 1975 to 1999. Both regimes inﬂicted casualties in similar proportions. Each 
caused the deaths of about one-ﬁfth of the population.6 Despite such serious violations 
of human rights, the UN Security Council remained amazingly quiet to both Cambodia 
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and Timor-Leste. In terms of Cambodia, after the Soviet use of their veto in 1976, the 
UN Security Council did not take up the issue of Cambodia again until 1990.7 Similarly, 
the UN Security Council had treated the East Timorese issue as an internal Indonesian 
matter. Indeed, only two UN Security Council resolutions8 were adopted on Timor-Leste 
during the Cold War era.
In Cambodia, under the Khmer Rouge’s rule, all foreigners were expelled and 
embassies closed. The use of foreign languages was banned. Newspapers and television 
stations were shut down. Money was forbidden. All businesses were shuttered, religion 
banned, education halted, healthcare eliminated, and parental authority revoked. 
Millions of Cambodians were forced into slave labor in “the killing ﬁelds”.9 The ﬁnal 
figure of mortality due to forced labor, torture, execution, malnutrition, or disease in 
Cambodia was approximately 1.7 million.
Indonesia’s rule in Timor-Leste had also been maintained in the most brutal way 
by Indonesian military. In the two months after Indonesia’s invasion of 1975, 60,000 
East Timorese people for independence were claimed killed by Indonesian troops, and 
from the time of the invasion in 1975, the Indonesian forces were directly responsible 
for one of the worst levels of mortality of any society in post-War history.10 Many 
East Timorese were, before they were killed, ill-treated or tortured in custody. Forms 
of torture included beatings with iron bars, batons and fists, burnings with lighted 
cigarettes, slashing with razor blades and immersion for long periods in fetid water.11 
Estimated mortality of Timor-Leste was approximately 170,000.
Furthermore, in both cases, most of the brutal killings occurred in the five-year 
period from 1975 to 1980. Cambodia and East Timor not only shared the experience of 
genocide but also civil war.12 Such serious human rights violations combined with huge 
scales of mortality and civil wars were almost totally ignored during the Cold War by 
the international community. Then, in the post-Cold War period, both Cambodia and 
Timor-Leste engendered deep sympathy and led to international interventions in the 
form of UN peace operations.
Since the Vietnamese military invaded and ruled Cambodia in 1979, a civil war 
had prevailed. In 1982, the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC (Front Uni Nationale Pour Un 
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Cambodge Independent, Neutre, paciﬁque, et Cooperatif) led by Sihanouk and his son 
Nordon Ranariddh, and the KPNLF (Khmer People’s National Liberation Front), a pro-
Western group led by Son Sann, joined forces and created the Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). After several years of military stalemate, a 
negotiation process began. After several negotiations among the four factions initiated 
by western powers and ASEAN countries, the Paris Accord was signed to settlement of 
the entire Cambodia conﬂict, on 23 October 1991. The Paris Accord had two primary 
goals: to end international involvement in the war; and to transform the military conﬂict 
into a political contest.13 To achieve these goals, the Paris Accord mandated UNTAC, 
commencing in February 1992, for the peace-building process in multi-dimensional 
sectors such as military functions, civil administration, elections, human rights, refugee 
repatriation, and economic rehabilitation.14
Meanwhile, in the post Cold War period East Timor’s independence also gained 
international support after witnessing a significant level of human rights abuses by 
Indonesian troops. Furthermore, several factors affected international responses 
and encouraged the process of self-determination by the East Timorese people. 
These included: the so-called ‘Santa Cruise massacre’15 of November 1991, and the 
replacement of the Suharto regime in 1998 followed by the East Asian currency crisis. 
On 5 May 1999, the “5 May Agreement” was signed by Indonesia, Portugal and the 
UN, enabling the UN Secretary General to hold a referendum on Indonesia’s autonomy 
package. The Agreement led to the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and the 
following UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999. It 
was the ﬁrst operation in which the UN took control of the departments of Government 
in Timor-Leste such as Finance, Justice, Infrastructure, Economic and Social Affairs 
etc. UNTAET took on a huge variety of responsibilities, such as responsibility for 
policing as well as for elections, executive, legislative and judicial sectors, and treaty-
making. Thus, both Cambodia and Timor-Leste accepted peace operations which were 
the largest in UN history and both operations played a signiﬁcant role in “Transitional” 
functions (“Authority” and “Administration”, respectively).
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3. The Case of Cambodia
3-1 Lessons Learnt from UNTAC
Much of the literature on peace-building in Cambodia concludes that UNTAC 
was a partial success. It is generally accepted that international attention to Cambodia 
and the advent of UNTAC contributed to the termination of long-lasting civil wars 
in Cambodia at least. One of the most important factors indicating the successful 
operation of UNTAC was its conduct of the general election in May 1993. About 90% 
of registered voters participated. The electoral process was rather peaceful, and the 
Khmer Rouge did not disrupt the voting process. FUNCINPEC took over 45 percent of 
the vote and won 58 of the 120 seats in the new Constituent Assembly. The Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP) finished in second place and got 38 percent of the vote and 51 
seats. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) finished in third, getting only 
4 percent and 10 seats. Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General, declared that the election was totally free and fair, and appealed to all sides to 
respect the outcome of the vote.16 States’ holding successful general elections by the 
UN or by themselves is generally regarded as a symbol of a democratic society. It was 
also significant for UNTAC that 372,000 refugees were successfully repatriated from 
the camps in Thailand and near the border, with the support of other humanitarian and 
relief agencies and NGOs. The success of UNTAC contributed to enhancing, or at least, 
maintaining, the reputation of UN peace operations themselves, since several other 
UN operations established at nearly the same period, such as ones in Somalia (United 
Nations Operations in Somalia: UNOSOM II) and in the former Yugoslavia (United 
Nations Protection Force: UNPROFOR), had been seriously criticized for their peace-
keeping and enforcing performances.
As UNTAC has been considered as a partial or “qualified” success, international 
society can learn a number of lessons from UNTAC. The first lesson is on rapid 
deployment and preparedness. Trevor Findlay agreed that UNTAC’s late deployment 
was one of the biggest ﬂaws of the Cambodian mission.17 The plan for UNTAC was not 
presented to the Security Council until 19 February 1992, four months after the Paris 
Accord, and UNTAC itself was not fully deployed until almost nine months after the 
signing of the Paris Accord. Lise Howard pointed out several causes for the delayed 
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deployment of UNTAC: France and Australia’s rivalry over the leadership in Cambodia’s 
peace process; the delay of logistics preparation due to inclement weather; the difﬁculty in 
managing UNTAC in addition to two other large UN operations in Somalia and the former 
Yugoslavia; and the subsequent slow procedures for deciding budgets for UNTAC.18 It 
can also be argued that the delays were due to UNTAC’s slow discovery of the realities 
that Cambodia suffered complete devastation of its infrastructure and human resources 
after two decades of war, a genocidal regime, foreign occupation and international 
isolation.19 Michael Doyle argued that late deployment lost the momentum derived from 
popular support, from the commitment of the parties, and from the psychological weight 
associated with a large operation moving rapidly towards an agreed goal.20 James Schear 
also claimed that the delay in UNTAC deployment, most damagingly, contributed to a 
sense of political drift and disarray allowing the four Khmer factions, in particular the 
Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen regime (CPP), to hedge positions on full compliance with 
the Paris Accord.21
The second lesson to be learnt, which is related to the first, is the difficulty for 
UN peace operations to ensure a sufficiently neutral political environment for the 
election. The creation of “a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair 
elections” was a key provision of the Paris Accord.22 However, such a neutral political 
environment seemed to be difficult to create in Cambodia given the state’s historical 
background:
The agreement between the Cambodians which the Paris Accords embodied were 
extremely fragile, not only because of the bitterness and animosties aroused by decades 
of civil war but also because fundamentally they were the product of efforts made by 
the international community rather than by Cambodia themselves. To a great extent 
the Accords were pressed on a mostly reluctant Cambodian elite by an international 
community eager to be rid of the Cambodian problem.23
On 11 January 1993, less than ﬁve months before the elections, Mr. Yasushi Akashi 
in UNTAC declared that the neutral political atmosphere indispensable for free and fair 
elections had not yet been achieved. Hendrickson argued that UNTAC could not neutralize 
the power of the CPP. Therefore, the Khmer Rouge, which had been “instinctively 
suspicious and emotionally unprepared for a (Cambodian) settlement”,24 refused to 
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participate in the elections and in the demobilization process. Thus, the Khmer Rouge’s 
departure from the Cambodian peace process prevented UNTAC from implementing one 
pillar of its mandate of the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of 70 percent of 
local forces.
The third lesson learnt from UNTAC is the significance of civilian components 
including civil police in a peacekeeping and transitional mission. Since most of the 
states requesting post-conﬂict peace-building missions desperately need to enhance the 
domestic rule of law and to retrain local police forces, there is currently an increasing 
demand for civil police in UN peace-building. However, in the early 1990s policing was 
a relatively new experience for the UN. In fact, there were many problems with civil 
police in UNTAC. UNTAC’s 3,600-strong civilian police component (CIVPOL), drawn 
from 32 UN member states, was not fully deployed until the end of 1992. The quality of 
police personnel was extremely uneven. Many came from constabulary and paramilitary 
backgrounds and were not adept at community-based police techniques. A signiﬁcant 
number could speak neither English nor French, the operation’s two ofﬁcial languages 
as well as the native language of Khmer. Yasushi Akashi also admitted that thirteen of 
the 14 states which contributed more than 100 CIVPOLs were developing countries, 
where police forces are often associated with indiscipline, human rights abuses and 
corruption.
The fourth lesson is the so-called “exit strategy”. Many involved in UNTAC 
claimed that UNTAC departed from Cambodia too early. For example, Ashley claimed 
that there was still no effective institution and no legal enforceable legal provision when 
UNTAC left.25 A Force Commander of UNTAC, Sanderson, supported Ashley from the 
viewpoint of democracy-building. He argued that although the UN stayed in Cambodia 
after its role as the transitional authority was concluded this presence merely assured 
the international community that surrounding nations stayed out of Cambodian affairs, 
complying with the Paris Accord. This was, however, much less than many Cambodian 
people expected.26 Such an early withdrawal of UNTAC negatively influenced the 
democratization process in its aftermath in Cambodia as mentioned in the next section.
3-2 Cambodia in the post-UNTAC Period
UNTAC terminated its mission and withdrew its personnel in September 1993. 
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However, the political environment in Cambodia in the aftermath of withdrawal was 
far from democratic. Even after the 1993 election, the ongoing hostility between Hun 
Sen’s CPP and Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC in the Coalition Government resulted in 
political stalemate in Cambodia. Furthermore, the Coalition Government was extremely 
unwilling to accept political opposition. The Government’s response to Sam Rainsy 
and his Khmer Nation Party (KNP) was a signiﬁcant indicator of this attitude. Rainsy 
protested against Government-level corruption after he had served as the ﬁrst Finance 
Minister in the Coalition Government for two years following the 1993 election. The 
Government did not accept Rainsy’s party as legitimate, claiming that KNP did not ﬁle 
proper the documents. Similarly, the BLDP was not allowed to hold a party congress 
in Phnom Penh for seemingly technical reasons.27 These repressive attitudes of the 
Government towards opposition contrasted with the UN policy in the 1993 election 
where as many as twenty parties participated. In 1996, there was a serious incident 
at the office of the BLDP in which three grenades were thrown, resulting in many 
injuries.28
In early 1997, there were outbreaks of military clashes between the CPP and 
FUNCINPEC in Phnom Penh and some other cities. Civil war finally broke out in July 
1997. Hun Sen ransacked FUNCINPEC offices and newspapers. Civil rights activists 
estimated that extra-judicial killings continued for days. Ranariddh was virtually ousted. 
FUNCINPEC forces collapsed, and the conﬂict was resolved by the superior force of arms. 
However, the international community including ASEAN supported Ranariddh’s claim 
that the war had been a pre-emptive coup by Hun Sen. Therefore, Ranariddh returned to 
Phnom Penh under international protection and took part in internationally-monitored 
elections in June 1998.29 However, after the 1998 elections30, Ranariddh no longer played a 
leading role in Cambodian politics, and Hun Sen increasingly dominated.
In his paper “Democracy in Cambodia - One Decade, US$5 Billion Later: What 
Went Wrong?”, Ronald Bruce St John attributed the above events to Cambodian 
culture. He argued that in Cambodia the Western concept of a loyal opposition was an 
imported idea alien to traditional culture in a country where no government had ever 
given up power without ﬁghting. Cambodian leaders traditionally considered domestic 
politics as “a zero-sum game”.31 Hun Sen could not tolerate any form of opposition and 
dissent. In the end, as Roberts pointed out, the democratization process in Cambodia 
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merely changed the vehicle for communicating hostility and confrontation, from war to 
elections at the elite level.32
The democratization process in Cambodia has also faced difficulties due to 
limitation of the human rights and widespread corruption in many sectors. For example, 
freedom of the press was signiﬁcantly curtailed in the post-UNTAC period. A number 
of Cambodia journalists, who took an anti-government line, were killed, injured, or 
arrested and some of them received severe sentences for trivial offences.33 Meanwhile, 
the judicial system was controlled by politicians. As Woods put it:
Without the restraint and accountability of the courts, the executive branch continues 
to gain power and can imprison or release an accused as it wishes. … Dissenting political 
parties are persecuted and, politically, the people are caught between fear and inaction.34
In fact, one could see multiple forms of corruption in Cambodia. They included, 
for example, bribery in the manufacturing and service sectors, non-payment of taxes, 
government-sponsored smuggling, and so-called “ghost” and non-existent soldiers and 
civil servants drawing salaries.35
One of the objects of establishing UNTAC was democratization in Cambodia. 
Cambodia’s democratization seemed to be significantly improved by the successful 
completion of the UN-led election in 1993. However, in retrospect, it was clear that the 
UN overestimated the effectiveness of the “democratic” elections contributing to the 
building of a democratic state. Cambodian politics has been going back to its old system 
of a one-party state. Furthermore, Cambodia has been suffering from social injustice 
and corruption. Elite politics has hardly changed since the democratization initiatives 
taken by UNTAC.
4. The Case of Timor-Leste
4-1 A Comparative Analysis
UN peace-building should evolve. As mentioned above, this paper identiﬁed a lot 
of commonalities in the peace-building process between Cambodia and Timor-Leste. 
Meanwhile, UN peace-building in Timor-Leste, which started in 1999 and therefore had 
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about a seven-year gap with that of Cambodia, should have learnt several lessons from 
UNTAC.
First, the UN peace-building process in Timor-Leste has been a longer term mission 
than Cambodia. While the UN spent less than 2 years for its two peace missions, United 
Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and UNTAC in Cambodia, the 
UN has been involved in Timor-Leste for more than seven years, as Table 1. indicates. 
There have been ﬁve UN missions in Timor-Leste. Such a long commitment of the UN 
to Timor-Leste indicates not only the organization’s stronger will but also presumably 
lessons learnt from previous missions such as UNTAC.
Table 1.
Cambodia
Peace
Missions Duration  Mandates
UNAMIC Oct.1991-Mar. 1992 Assisting the Cambodian parties to maintain their Ceaseﬁre
UNTAC Feb. 1992-Sep. 1993 Comprehensive peace-building including conducting elections
Timor-Leste
Peace 
Missions Durations Mandate
UNAMET Jun. 1999-Oct. 1999 Conducting referendum
INTERFET Sep. 1999-Oct. 1999 Suppressing the rebellion after the referendum
UNTAET Oct. 1999-May. 2002 Comprehensive nation-building toward independence
UNMISET May 2002-Aug. 2005 Training troops and police after independence 
UNOTIL Aug. 2005-Aug. 2006 Good ofﬁce mission in the stabilized period
UNMIT Aug. 2006- Suppressing riots and training police 
INTERFET: International Force for East Timor (Non-UN Mission)　　　　　　　　(Source: Compiled by the Author)
UNMISET: United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNOTIL: United Nations Ofﬁce in Timor-Leste
UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
Second, when one compares UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAET in Timor-Leste, 
UNTAET has more extensive power than UNTAC, as can be seen from Table 2. Indeed, 
UNTAET was the ﬁrst UN mission that had treaty-making powers.
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Table 2.
Mission Date Police Elections Executive Legislative Judicial Treaty
UNITAG
(Namibia) 1989-1990 Yes
UNTAC
(Cambodia) 1992-1993 Yes Yes As necessary
UNMIK
(Kosovo) 1999- Yes
Yes
(OSCE) Yes Yes Yes
UNTAET
(Timor-Leste) 1999-2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Source: Chesterman S. You, the People: Transitional Administration, State-Building and the
United Nations, An International Peace Academy Report, November 2003)
UNITAG: United Nations Transition Assistance Group 
UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
Table 3. indicates the comparison in authorized maximum strength of personnel 
between UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAET in Timor-Leste. It can be concluded 
that both missions were authorized with massive strength and that UNTAC started its 
mission with larger strength than UNTAET. However, there was a huge difference in 
population between the two countries, and as can be seen from the factor of population 
per UN Military, UNTAET was a relatively more extensive mission. (While a PKF 
solider in UNTAC was supposed to protect 813 Cambodian people on average, in 
UNTAET a soldier took responsibility of protecting only 111 East Timorese.)
Table 3.
Authorized Maximum Strength and National Populations
Cambodia (UNTAC) Timor-Leste (UNTAET)
Military 16,440 9,150
Civilian Police 3,500 1,640
International Civilian Staff 1,149 1,288
Contributing States 46 states 47 states
National Populations (,000) 13,363 (2004) 1,019 (2004)
Populations per UN Military 813 111
(Source: http://www.un.org/ Author’s Calculations)
The key conclusion that can be drawn from the above three Tables is that the UN 
made a stronger commitment to peace-building in Timor-Leste than Cambodia. The UN 
has spent more time, assumed more responsibilities and committed more forces to the 
former than the latter.
Why did the UN decide to give such a strong- or maybe the strongest- commitment 
to Timor-Leste? Several reasons can be considered to answer the question. First of all, 
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UN peace-building in Timor-Leste had to ﬁll a political, economic and social vacuum 
created by the militia campaign in 1999. In short, it had to start from scratch. It was 
totally different from the case of Cambodia. Therefore, the UN required a larger scale of 
military strength and civilian personnel to initiate nation-building in Timor-Leste.
Second, the UN peace operations which had been established before UNTAET, 
such as that in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Rwanda (United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda: UNAMIR) had been universally criticized in terms of 
operational effectiveness and implementation. These operations gave the international 
community the lessons that extensive peace operations, especially led by Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, require more robust mandates. This was also recognized by the UN 
ofﬁcial report, the “Brahimi Report”36 of August 2000.
4-2 Is Peace-building in Timor-Leste learning from Cambodia?
4-2-1 Rapid deployment and preparedness?
As mentioned earlier, UNTAC in 1992 had a serious problem on rapid deployment 
and preparedness. This lesson was not learnt in peace-building in Timor-Leste.
In September 2002, a large and extensive conference on UNTAET, “The United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor” (UNTAET): Debriefing and 
Lessons, was held and co-sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research (UNITAR), the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) of Singapore, and the Japan 
Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), in Tokyo. Several participants from UNTAET 
accepted the fact that UNTAET commenced without proper planning.
The planning of UNTAET followed the pattern of the UN administration in 
Kosovo. However, Takashima Kawakami, Director of the International Peace 
Cooperation Division in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that 
the degree of the burden of the UN’s mission in East Timor was different from that of 
Kosovo. In Kosovo, tasks were divided into four categories, three of which were under 
the responsibility of UNHCR, OSCE and the EU, and security was in the hands of the 
NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). However, in the case of Timor-Leste, UNTAET 
took responsible for everything, including the military sector, which was handed over 
from INTERFET.37 Furthermore, UNTAET was the ﬁrst UN mission with a mandate to 
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enforce peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and to build capacity and to govern 
simultaneously. Despite early predictions of deployment, there was an underestimation 
of the time required to plan. It was initially planned that UNTAET be set up by 
November 1999,38 although actual deployment occurred one month earlier. Accordingly, 
the planning was initiated by an ad hoc team within the UN Headquarters as a matter 
of urgency and was under enormous pressure. At the time, the UN was also involved 
in the planning and setting-up process of two other UN peacekeeping operations, 
namely the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMISIL) and a mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). According to Bob Breen, a researcher at 
the Australian National University, there were limited administrative capabilities in UN 
Headquarters for preparation of UNTAET.39 There was also unnecessary internal friction 
between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)40 and Department of Peace Keeping 
Operations (DPKO) regarding the planning of UNTAET. In fact, the DPKO was not 
confirmed in its role until September 1999. The sudden departure of all Indonesian 
administrators and experts from Timor-Leste had a negative impact on proper planning 
and the establishment process of UNTAET.
As a result, the ad hoc planning team had to improvise staff tables and proﬁles, and 
was not capable of producing a transitional administration plan. They were not provided 
with time to visit East Timor to receive a brieﬁng from UNAMET staff to help assess 
the local situation, or to analyse and anticipate any possible difﬁculties for UNTAET.41 
Furthermore, the Special Representative of the Secretary General arrived in Dili almost 
four weeks after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999. 
Many of the key staff and much of the logistical support did not arrive until the early 
months of 2000. Therefore, as James Batley, Assistant Secretary of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Australian Government, put it, “For many weeks … 
UNTAET was a skeleton operation at best.”42 It was inevitable that UNTAET would 
take several months to establish a proper roadmap for its operations. The delay in setting 
up UNTAET forced several professionals to return to regular jobs or find alternative 
employment to secure an income.
Recruiting international and local staff gave rise to several serious problems. 
Kawakami pointed out that no organisation in East Timor was able to provide 
experienced civil administrators, whose participation would have made a significant 
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difference in the work of the administration. Furthermore, there were only a few full-
time staff members on the teams.43 The relationship between the East Timorese and 
international community underlined the gap in understanding and expectations; the East 
Timorese expected UNTAET to come in and solve their problems overnight, whilst 
international staff were still deciding what to do after their arrival. Thus, the extreme 
gap in the conception towards UNTAET led to a perception by the East Timorese of 
UNTAET as “neo-colonizers”.44
It is debatable whether the initial timetable for UNTAET was adequate and proper. 
The schedule to East Timorese ofﬁcial independence on 20 May 2002 was so hectic that 
some Timorese leaders would have preferred a five-year transition to independence. 
Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo also expressed the concern that the political timetable was 
so short that there was likely to be a highly volatile electorate at the time of the election. 
The timetable was essentially created by UN Headquarters and UNTAET, which 
thwarted subsequent East Timorese attempts to revise it.45 The lack of inﬂexibility by 
UNTAET on the transition timetable negatively inﬂuenced the following administrative 
and political process towards independence.
Thus, there were many problems on rapid deployment and preparedness in the 
peace-building process in Timor-Leste. As mentioned previously, the mandate of 
UNTAET was the biggest and most ambitious ever. Unfortunately, this was not properly 
appreciated by the UN Headquarters. However, such improvisation, an underestimation 
of the scale of the problem and an immaturity within UN Headquarters had already been 
experienced in UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992, as has been stated before.
4-2-2 Political settlement and democratization?
In Cambodia, the hostility between two major political parties, the CPP and 
FUNCINPEC, led to deterioration of the political settlement in the state even after the 
withdrawal of UNTAC. A similar situation can be identiﬁed in the case of Timor-Leste.
In Timor-Leste, after peace- and nation-building was initiated by the involvement 
of the UN in 1999, it became clear that the revolutionary leader Xanana Gusmao and 
the key members of Fretilin, which Gusmao previously led, displayed hostility to each 
other. When Timor-Leste became independent and Gusmao became the ﬁrst president 
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in May 2002, the new state adopted a semi-presidential system. This political system 
has four organs of governance: the government, the president, the parliament and 
the courts, and it became disproportionately imbalanced in terms of powers, with the 
government being extraordinarily strong compared with the other three. Especially, the 
power of Gusmao as president became minimized in the state’s constitution because 
of this rivalry. In particular, political rivalry between President Gusmao and Prime 
Minister Alkatiri negatively influenced capacity-building on governance. President 
Gusmao supported pluralism in the political system in Timor-Leste, favoring a multi-
party system, while Prime Minister Alkatiri tried to enhance authoritarian tendencies in 
the ruling party of Fretilin. Although Gusmao’s policy of a multi-party system should 
be widely supported for the principle of democracy in general, in Timor-Leste the 
single party policy of Alkatiri also gained broad support from many Timorese people 
who had experienced the history of bloody party struggle for independence during the 
Indonesian occupation period. Gusmao and Alkatiri also had different views on how 
state-building should be conducted in their new nation. Gusmao preferred depending 
on more international troops and organizations, while Alkatiri supported the policy of 
“Timorization”. Although Timorization was broadly supported in 2002 and 2003, the 
rapid downsizing of international advisors in civil services diminished the speed of 
capacity-building.
The above hostility and political instability in Timor-Leste chronically brought 
about serious civil unrest and riots. On 4 December 2002, a large scale riot erupted 
among local people in the capital of Dili. This riot resulted in two deaths. In January 
2003, pro-Indonesian militiamen murdered six East Timorese villagers with the aim of 
destabilizing the newly-independent state.46
Above all, political unrest in Timor-Leste was revealed by a series of events 
culminating in a political, humanitarian and security crisis in April and May 2006, 
what came to be known as the “2006 Crisis”. The crisis originated in January 2006 
when the group called “the petitioners” claimed mismanagement and discrimination 
within the military, the F-FDTL. In February 2006, 418 petitioners held a march on 
the Presidential Palace, requesting President Xanana Gusmao to respond. On 24 April 
2006, 594 dismissed soldiers and their supporters started four days of demonstrations 
in the capital of Dili after negotiations between the soldiers and senior police ofﬁcers in 
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PNTL. On 28 April, several youths broke through the lines of the police and attacked 
the Government Building. It triggered the deterioration of security in the entire area 
of Dili. The anger and distrust among the Timorese led to the spread of huge riots 
throughout the city of Dili. As a result, many public and private buildings were seriously 
damaged, and about 15,000 Timorese people sought refuge in churches, public buildings 
and the UN facilities in Dili, while others left for the districts.47
In the national congress of the ruling Fretilin party on 17-19 May 2006, Prime 
Minister Alkatiri was re-elected Fretilin’s Secretary-General. However, the voting 
method was changed from a secret ballot to a show of hand-raising. Therefore, many 
citizen in Dili showed suspicion in terms of the legitimacy of the vote. Meanwhile, the 
then Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato was alleged to distribute the weapons of PNTL 
to two militia groups to use them against their political opponents. He was sentenced 
to seven years and six month imprisonment for this allegation in March 2007. F-FDTL 
also began to arm civilians on 24 May 2006. This was done on the order of Brigadier 
General Ruak and with the knowledge of the Minister of Defence, Rogue Rodrigues, 
and Prime Minister Alkatiri.48 Alkatiri was also forced to resign after this allegation in 
June 2006. Furthermore, in May 2006, the solidarity in F-FDTL was ruined when Major 
Alfred Reinado, the head of the military police in F-FDTL, refused an order from army 
leaders to act against the 594 petitioning soldiers. He and his followers instead left the 
army and took to the mountains, armed with guns.49 There was increasing confrontation 
between the F-FDTL and PNTL. This confrontation culminated on 25 May 2006, when 
members of F-FDTL opened fire on PNTL officers when they were escorted by UN 
ofﬁcers from the PNTL headquarters. This incident resulted in the killing of eight PNTL 
ofﬁcers and injuring more than 25.50
Furthermore, in February 2008, the new President Jose Ramos Horta was shot 
and seriously injured in an attack by the rebel leader Alfred Reinado, who was himself 
shot dead. An assassination attempt was also made on the new Prime Minister Xanana 
Gusmao.
The Economist argued, “Timor-Leste has collapsed through a combination of 
incompetent and faction-ridden government, deep poverty and lingering political splits 
that go back to the independence struggle.”51 The UN Secretary-General mentioned in 
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his report to the Security Council that the causes of the crisis in Timor-Leste stemmed 
from political, institutional, historical, social and economic dimensions.52 Political 
stalemate in Timor-Leste can also be recognized by the fact that about 100,000 Timorese 
people still remain in the refugee camps to which they ﬂed in the 2006 Crisis.53
It can be noted that the case of Timor-Leste has another signiﬁcant commonality 
with that of Cambodia. Both UNTAC in Cambodia and UNTAET and UNMISET in 
Timor-Leste collected highly positive evaluations as successful cases of UN operations 
when they completed their mandates and withdrew. However, despite such applause in 
the early stage, the entire peace-building process could not be improved as expected in 
both states, especially in terms of political stability and democratization. Gradually, the 
assessments of the two UN peace operations by practitioners and academics have been 
deteriorating. Eventually, they were called “a partial success” at best. Arguably, the case 
of Timor-Leste will be more serious, since the UN peace-building efforts were initiated 
with ﬁnancially and physically stronger commitments than Cambodia.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that one of the main causes of political instability 
in Cambodia was identified in the case of Timor-Leste. That is, the hostility between 
Gusmao and Fretilin led by Alkatiri in Timor-Leste in early 2000s is comparable with 
that between Hun Sen and Ranariddh in Cambodia in the late 1990s. In Timor-Leste, 
although Fretilin could not be a government party, it did not accept itself as a “loyal 
opposition”. Fretilin started as a political party aiming at the independence of East 
Timor from Indonesia by means of guerrilla warfare. Therefore, such a belligerent 
tradition discouraged Fretilin from giving up without a fight, similar to Cambodian 
political parties.
In terms of democratization, the judicial issue has also been problematic in 
Timor-Leste, which is similar to Cambodia. A key issue which one can identify is the 
premature departure of the international mission from the justice sector of Timor-Leste. 
The Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and Special Panels for Serious Crimes were established 
in 2000 by UNTAET, and mandated to conduct investigations, prosecutions, and 
judicial proceedings relevant to serious crimes committed in 1999 in Timor-Leste. Since 
the SCU commenced its mission, 95 indictments have been ﬁled with the Special Panel, 
indicting 391 persons. Among them were numbers of Indonesian National Military 
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(TNI) including General Wiranto, six high-ranking TNI commanders, and the former 
Governor of East Timor. On 18 February 2005, the Commission of Experts to Review 
the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste in 1999 (COE) 
was established following the request of the UN Security Council to the Secretary-
General. The report of the COE concluded that the serious crimes process in the SCU 
has not yet achieved full accountability.54
However, the SCU prematurely withdrew from Timor-Leste. In accordance 
with Security Council Resolution 1543 of 14 May 2004, the SCU completed all 
investigations by November 2004, and concluded all trials in the Special Panels by 
20 May 2005.55 As an alternative measure, the Governments of Indonesia and Timor-
Leste established the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) on 11 August 2005. 
The CTF is tasked with establishing the conclusive truth of the events prior to and after 
the referendum of 1999, with a view to promoting reconciliation and friendship.56 The 
Governments claimed that the question of justice and accountability must be considered 
within the context of the political realities of each country and with a view to forging a 
healthy bilateral relationship. However, the Commission of Experts (COE) found that 
the CTF contradicted international standards of denial of impunity for serious crimes.57 
The Secretary-General also viewed that it would be deeply regrettable if due to the CTF 
the reconciliation process foreclosed the possibility of achieving accountability for 
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.58
At the same time, the Commission for Reception Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), 
with the UN’s backing, investigated crimes against humanity for the period from 
Indonesia’ s invasion in 1975 to the killings as it withdrew in 1999. Its extensive ﬁnal 
report, published in 2005, called for prosecution of serious crimes, although it has 
been virtually ignored by the Government of Timor-Leste as well as the international 
community.59
5. Results of Questionnaires
In 2004, the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs conducted a survey by 
questionnaire to the people of the states which experienced post-conflict peace-
building, including Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Among the questions was “the extent of 
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signiﬁcance of issues which, they think, states face” in post-conﬂict peace-building. The 
results are as indicated in Table 4.
Table 4.
The Extent of Signiﬁcance of Issues Which States Face in Post-Conﬂict Peace-building, As a 
Result of Questionnaires 
＊ the number of respondents: Cambodia 102, and Timor-Leste 103
Issues Cambodia (%) Timor-Leste (%)
Maintenance of Peace Agreement 63 64
Withdrawal of Militias 38 58
Refugee Repatriation 19 56
Reintegration with Minority People 18 69
De-repression of Under-privileged People 89 85
Maintenance of Basic Human Rights 78 83
Supply of Foods and Basic Items for Life 76 72
Reconstruction of Collapsed Houses 19 80
Restoration of Farming and Irrigation System 80 77
Restoration of Roads, Railways and Harbor Facilities 81 63
Improvement of Medical System 84 83
Improvement of Educational System 87 85
Demining 78 46
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 33 60
Prevention of Combatant Activities 26 56
Conduct of Free and Fair Elections 93 86
Improvement of Military ands Police System 55 71
Improvement of Civil Administration 76 72
Improvement of Judicial System 89 64
Restoration of Industries 54 67
Attracting Foreign Investments 80 63
(Source: Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Prevention of Conﬂicts: 
the Reality and Future, March 2005)
The survey was conducted in 2004, when Cambodia was already in the stability 
and development period, 11 years since UNTAC had left. Therefore, the results show 
a clear difference in the extent of signiﬁcance of issues which people considered to be 
resolved and not. For example, the issues of Refugee Repatriation and Reintegration 
with Minority People have already been almost solved in Cambodia. Meanwhile, since 
Timor-Leste was still in the early stage of the peace-building process in 2004, almost 
all of the issues on the list were still seen as important and needing to be tackled. 
However, it is highly noteworthy that both Cambodian and East Timorese people 
considered that issues relating to democratization, such as Conduct of Free and Fair 
Elections, Maintenance of Basic Human Rights, and Improvement of Judicial Issues, 
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were signiﬁcant ones which their states were yet to tackle. This means that it is highly 
probable that democratization issues will remain for the next decade or so in Timor-
Leste, following the pattern of Cambodia, unless the Government of Timor-Leste as 
well as the international community pays more serious attention to democratization.
6. Conclusion
This paper initially introduced several theories of peace-building by David Roberts, 
Roland Paris, Simon Chesterman and David Chandler. This paper, which focused on 
the case of peace-building process in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, showed that the 
arguments of their theories had legitimacy. Peace-building requires a longer-term 
commitment with proper and adequate channels and measures.
However, the case of Cambodia and Timor-Leste has posed a question on whether 
UN peace-building is properly learning lessons suggested by practitioners as well as 
academics. In fact, Timor-Leste is in the best position for this comparative analysis, 
since both states have so many commonalities in the background of peace-building. 
Furthermore, the international efforts for peace-building in Timor-Leste was more 
significant than Cambodia in the scale of missions, extensiveness of mandate, and 
duration. However, the issues of rapid deployment and strategic planning, and the 
democratization in the post-election period in Cambodia were clearly repeated in Timor-
Leste. Especially, both states have suffered from hostility among politicians and parties 
and the following chronic riots, rebellions and civil wars, and highly unjustiﬁed judicial 
issues which were politically neglected. Therefore, this paper might indicate the failure 
to enhance the effectiveness of peace-building by depending on lessons leant from 
previous missions.
In this context, what is the key to understanding “the failure”? Presumably, it cannot 
be explained by theory and lessons. They must be related to quite a new approach, that 
is “the clash of culture.”
For example, in terms of strategic planning in post-conflict peace-building, one 
might claim that developments on the ground change so rapidly that proper planning 
would be impossible. However, the UN has traditionally ad hoc and improvising culture. 
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UN peace operations, which started from UNEFI in 1956, have inherited the so-called 
“Hammarskjold’s legacy” as ad hoc missions. Such UN’s ad hoc culture clashes with 
that of host governments and their citizens, which have mostly had dependent culture as 
a legacy from the colonial periods. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, there was a cultural 
gap in which local people expected UN missions to come in and solve their problems 
overnight, whilst international staff are still deciding what to do after their arrival.
However, UN peace operations have evolved, and currently more multi-
functional and therefore preparatory peace-building is highly demanded. Furthermore, 
a great disadvantage for the UN is that the UN traditionally does not have a strategic 
intelligence unit. Although such a unit would be costly, it would help in improving early 
warning capabilities and specifying the precise timing and scale of personnel dispatch of 
UN peace-building. In a similar context, contrary to UN culture as a improvising nature, 
a new type of peace-building would need to establish stand-by agreements between the 
UN and host governments.60
“The clash of culture” was also identiﬁed in the democratization process. The UN, 
which has been highly inﬂuenced by western culture, regarded free and fair elections 
and referenda as a significant stepping stone to democracy, whereas such elections 
and referenda were traditionally nonexistent and culturally new for host governments. 
Furthermore, many states which accept post-conﬂict peace-building led by the UN have 
culturally gained their governing position through violently overthrowing an oppressive 
predecessor. Therefore, in their politics, the existence of legitimate opposition has been 
unfamiliar or unaccepted. This actually has happened in Cambodia and Timor-Leste as 
mentioned in this paper. Corruption, bribery and lack of transparency and accountability 
in governance might also be much more difﬁcult to solve for the UN in its missions than 
expected. This is also due to cultural gaps between the UN and host governments.
UN peace-building will not be successful even if it is financially and physically 
improved, unless it learns lessons from previous missions. However, it is not enough. 
Peace-building is a more human-related mission than traditional peacekeeping. Such a 
mission should pay more attention to the cultural aspect of indigenous people in host 
governments. UN culture should also be reconsidered if it does not meet the demand for 
current post-conﬂict peace-building.
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